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ABSTRACT
Statistical mechanics has proven to be able to capture the fundamental rules underlying phenomena of social
aggregation and opinion dynamics, well studied in disciplines like sociology and psychology. This approach is based
on the underlying paradigm that the interesting dynamics of multi-agent systems emerge from the correct definition
of few parameters governing the evolution of each individual. Into this context, we propose a particular model
of opinion dynamics based on the psychological construct named ”cognitive dissonance”. Our system is made of
interacting individuals, the agents, each bearing only two dynamical variables (respectively “opinion” and “affinity”)
self-consistently adjusted during time evolution. We also define two special classes of interacting entities, both acting
for a peace mediation process but via different course of action: “diplomats” and “auctoritates”. The behavior of
the system with and without peace mediators (PMs) is investigated and discussed with reference to corresponding
psychological and social implications.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years we have seen the emergence of a new breed of professionals broadly called Peace Mediators, PMs
for short, involved in the process of peace (re)construction. They are usually deployed in countries torn by conflict or
post-conflict areas in order to create conditions for sustainable peace. PMs actions aim to reduce the fragmentation
among different parts of the society until a widespread consensus is achieved and peace can be maintained.
Our model is based on the assumption that it is possible to study the evolution of a social phenomenon directly
by considering a few attributes of the individuals coupled by specific interaction rules. For these reasons, we adopt
an agent based model, in which local rules are inspired by the cognitive dissonance [1], a cognitive construct that
rules the evolution of human social cognition [2]. According to the Cognitive Dissonance Theory, when unknown
individuals interact, they experiment an internal conflicting state because of their reciprocal lack of information. In
order to avoid the cognitive dissonance, individuals adopt heuristics strategies with the aid of mental schemes [3], that
is, symbolic and synthetic representations built up through inferential, imaginative and emotional processes. Because
mental schemes can be upgraded in real time during interactions with other individuals, they are utilized as a guidance
for quick decisions in stereotypical situations. For instance, the mutual affinity is the mental scheme employed by
agents to overcome the lack of information about the others (that is, the cognitive dissonance) and to perform the
optimal choice in terms of opinion production. In particular, two heuristic strategies are mainly employed:
A) if the affinity towards the interacting partner is below some threshold, the individual tends to crystallize his/her
actual opinion, while for higher values of affinity he/she will change opinion in the direction of the partner’s
one;
B) if the opinion difference between the two interacting agents is below a critical value, then each one will increase
his/her affinity towards the partner, otherwise the affinity scores will decrease.
These two ways of acting are modulated by external factors, as for example the possibility of interacting given by
the social system, and especially by internal ones, such as the openness of mind and the confidence. The openness
of mind is the limit of permissiveness that an individual introduces interacting with other people, and allows to
ignore the perception of incompatibilities existing between oneself and the others; consequently, it makes possible to
interact with individuals having very distant opinions. On the other hand, the confidence is the minimal reputation
an individual requires to a stranger to accept instances from him/her. In practice, I will be more available to uniform
my opinions with the opinions of someone with a large affinity with myself. Moreover, affinity acts as a long term
memory in which individuals can store information useful to solve similar future situations.
By formalizing agents in such a way, we obtain a dynamical population where interacting agents share their opinions
by trying to maintain an acceptable level of dissonance. The asymptotic states of such system are either a global
consensus (i.e. into an hypothetical opinion space, a mono-clustered state) or a social fragmentation (i.e. crystalliza-
tion of no longer interacting clusters of opinion). Of course, in the vision of the PMs, social fragmentation has to
be considered a dangerous state, since once obliged to interact, the low level of mutual affinity and the differences
in opinion, may lead to strong social contrasts between these agents. For this reasons, the goal of the PMs can be
translated into a reduction of the social fragmentation, namely into a reduction of opinion distances among agents
into the opinion space.
The aim of this paper is to present two possible models of PM behavior. In the first case, we emphasize principally
the skill of interacting and negotiating with people along large opinion distances. We label these PMs as “diplomats”
and we tag their most prominent characteristic as a larger openness of mind. Classical examples are actual diplomats,
transactors, intermediaries, etc. On the other hand, we consider as another fundamental attribute of a PM his/her
reputation. Hence, we label this PM figure as an “auctoritas” (“authority”), which is characterized by an established
good reputation and the aptitude to influence the society by their prestige. For example, we can set in this category
Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela.
Targets of this work are to obtain a mathematical representation of both PM figures and to investigate by means of
numerical simulations how they can affect a formalized social system of normal agents in order to reach a widespread
social consensus.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is dedicated to describe the model. Then, in third section
we present the numerical results. Fourth and fifth sections are devoted to analytical considerations and theoretical
discussion, respectively. Finally, in the last section we will sum up and talk about future perspectives.
3II. THE MODEL
We approach the problem by means of the tools and methods of Sociophysics [4, 5]. In particular, the adopted
model, without PMs, has already been studied in previous studies [2, 6, 7]: indeed, we are going to refine it in the
present paper. Therefore, we briefly recall its main features. The model is characterized by a continuous opinion and
a random binary encounter dynamics, as in the Deffuant Model [8, 9], which ours is inspired to (at least the part
concerning the evolution of the opinions). We consider a system made up of N autonomous agents, the individuals,
each one identified by the index i = 1, . . . , N and characterized by the two (constant) parameters ∆Oic and α
i
c, which
are the openness of mind and the confidence[10], respectively. Moreover, each agent i is in general described by the
two internal variables Oi, its opinion, and αij (j = 1, . . . , N ; j 6= i), its affinity towards the other agents, which
vary in time. All ∆Oic, α
i
c, Oi and αij are real numbers ranging in the interval [0, 1]. The internal variables evolve
self-consistently during time evolution.
More precisely, let us consider an agent i interacting with another agent j: then, the opinion Oi and the affinity
αij (i.e., the affinity i feels towards j) are updated as follows [2, 6, 7]:
Ot+1i = O
t
i − µ ∆Otij Γ1(αtij) (1)
αt+1ij = α
t
ij + α
t
ij [1− αtij ] Γ2(∆Otij) (2)
where the activating functions Γ1 and Γ2 read, respectively:
Γ1(α
t
ij) = Θ(α
t
ij − αic) (3)
Γ2(∆O
t
ij) = 1− 2 Θ(|∆Otij | −∆Oic) (4)
being ∆Otij = O
t
i − Otj the difference at time t between the two opinion values of the interacting partners, µ a
convergence parameter and Θ(·) is the Heaviside step function. In practice, an agent i interacting with another agent
j changes its opinion only if its affinity towards j is larger than its own confidence αic: in that case, the opinion
updates according to the already mentioned Deffuant rule. Analogously, agent i evolves the affinity towards j only if
their opinions differ less than i’s openness of mind. If this is the case, the updating of αtij is not linear: the logistic
term keeps the affinity in the interval [0, 1]; moreover, it maximizes the change in affinity for pairs with αij ' 0.5,
corresponding to agents which have not come often in contact. Couples with αij ' 1 (resp. 0) have already formed
their mind and, as expected, behave more conservatively. Anyway, a more thorough justification of these rules, also
from a psycho-social point of view, can be found in reference [2].
At each elementary time step the two interacting agents are selected as follows: the agent i is drawn with uniformly
distributed probability from the population, whilst agent j is the one which minimizes the social metric
Dtij = d
t
ij + η(0, σ) , (5)
composed by the two terms, respectively the social distance
dtij = ∆O
t
ij(1− αtij) j = 1, ..., N j 6= i (6)
and the gaussian noise (η) with mean value zero and variance σ (which is also called social temperature [3]), modulating
the mixing degree in the population. The above formulas mean that two agents are more likely to interact when their
opinions have a small difference and/or their affinity is larger, but, due to the social temperature, it is always possible
an interaction between two individuals with very different opinions or very small reciprocal affinity. More precisely,
in absence of social noise (σ = 0), an agent will surely interact with the stranger which minimizes the social distance
dtij , with σ → +∞ the interactions are completely random, for intermediate values most matches will be between
individuals at short social distance, with few long-range interactions. A time unit is made up of N single elementary
time steps (Montecarlo steps).
Being the ultimate goal of PMs the reduction of social fragmentation, both diplomats and auctoritates will act in
this direction, but via different courses of action. Diplomats are assumed to have a larger ∆Oc then normal agents
and consequently they can interact in the opinion space with far away agents. According to Eq. 1, this way of acting
will lead to an increase of the individuals affinity towards diplomats. On the other hand, auctoritates are assumed to
employ their notoriety; this is translated in our model by imposing that all agents have a larger affinity value towards
them, directly promoting the convergence into opinion space.
4III. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Simulations are performed with following parameters. N is fixed once for all to 100, including PMs. The social
temperature σ, the affinity threshold αc and the convergence parameter µ are fixed once for all, respectively at 0.003,
0.5 and 0.5. Normal agents have a ∆Oc = 0.2, while for diplomats ∆Oc = 0.5. Entries in the affinity matrix α are
initialized between normal agents with uniformly distributed probability in [0, 0.5], while entries corresponding to
normal agents towards auctoritates are set at 0.75. We have chosen the above values of the parameters as the most
reasonable and conservative possible, in order not to have an unbalanced system (agents not too mind-opened nor
too mind-closed, affinity distribution not too narrow nor too broad, etc.); moreover, the chosen value for σ allows the
existence of interactions among socially distant agents maintaining higher probabilities for matches between socially
closer individuals. Anyway, we have also verified that the results we are going to present in this section are rather
robust by varying such values: unless extreme values are chosen, the system behavior qualitatively does not change.
We have considered both the fraction of PMs over the entire population and their distribution in the opinion space
as the relevant control parameters, hereby measuring the mean number of survived clusters at the equilibrium over
100 runs. The range of employed PMs is from 5% to 50% in steps of 5%. We remark that, so as formalized, the
increase of fraction of PMs can corresponds respectively either to a fixed number of PMs having to do with smaller
group, or to a population having a higher mean ∆Oc (diplomats).
Runs are stopped when the system converge to an equilibrium asymptotic state. We define such a state is reached
when the affinity matrix will no longer change. We know that for communities larger than 20 agents, the system
converge with respect to the opinion before than respect to the affinity [7]. Hence, when affinity reaches a state where
it no longer evolves, the whole system, i.e. also the opinion, will freeze. Such asymptotic state will be characterized
by the number of clusters in the opinion dimension.
Scenarios. The behavior of the two PMs figures are separately studied in a starting system which entries of
opinion vector O are initialized uniformly spaced in [0, 1]. Diplomats are distributed along the opinion space by
substituting them to the already initialized normal agents and according with the following modalities. In the
“uniform” distribution diplomats are spread along the opinion space with uniformly distributed probability; in the
“gaussian” one with a gaussian distribution (mean 0.5, standard deviation 0.2); in the “bimodal” distribution they
are inserted with a bimodal distribution, that is, half of them with initial opinion equal 0.25 and half equal to 0.75.
The same opinion vector initialization and strategy distribution are used for auctoritates, with the addition of a
“delta” strategy in which all auctoritates are grouped around the center of the opinion space, namely around 0.5.
The “two opposing factions” case - Hereby we propose an application of the model. We consider a starting
opinion space in which agents are divided into two large clusters, such that their respective opinion distances are
larger than the opinion threshold of any single agent (“bi-clustered system”). In such a way, there is no possibility
of interaction between agents belonging to the two different groups. Nevertheless, diplomats are able to interact with
both factions because of their large openness of mind, while auctoritates can attract individuals because of their
high reputation. We thus compare the two different courses of action. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of their
action, we tested every configuration with a different density of mediators, from zero up to 50% (of course, such a
high presence of mediators does not take place in the real world, anyway it is useful to reach it for a better theoretical
understanding of their role).
IV. RESULTS
Figure 1 shows typical trajectories into the opinion space of a system of normal agents (1a), a system influenced by
diplomats (1b) and a system influenced by auctoritates (1c), respectively. While the system of normal agents quickly
converge to a fragmented asymptotic state, the insertion of PMs increases the convergence time needed as so as the
chances of obtaining a mono-clustered state. We remark the different courses of action of the two PMs. Because of
the great ∆Oc value, diplomat increases affinity towards neighborhood, approaches partner and inclines it towards
its own opinion. Agents inside the opinion bounds of diplomat have a larger probability of collapse in the same final
position, and the diplomat has the possibility to explore the entire opinion space. On the other hand, an auctoritas
tends to reach the equilibrium with the same opinion value with respect to the initial condition. In this latter case,
the affinities of normal agents towards auctoritates trigger the convergence dynamics to monocluster.
Figure 2 resumes results relative to diplomats. The insertion of diplomats reduces the mean degree of fragmentation
at equilibrium. Moreover, this reduction is linear and positively correlate with the fraction of employed diplomats.
Although the three distribution strategies have similar trends (Fig. 2a), by augmenting the fraction of diplomats, the
gaussian one tends to reach the greater number of mono-clusters at equilibrium (Fig. 2b, lower).
5FIG. 1. Typical opinion trajectories. Each time step are 104 interactions. a) Normal agents (see ref. [2]); b) Normal agents
(black) and diplomats (red); c) Normal agents (black) and auctoritates (red).
FIG. 2. Behavior of a system modulated by diplomats, for three different initial distributions. a) Mean number of survived
clusters at the equilibrium as a function of the fraction of diplomats. b) Probability of having N clusters at the equilibrium in
a single run, 5% of diplomats (upper figure), 50% of diplomats (lower); for sake of clearness, the histograms are interpolated
by ninth degree polynomials (naturally, the effectively measured probabilities are in correspondence of integer values of the
abscissas).
Figure 3 resumes results relative to auctoritates. Once more the insertion of PMs reduces the mean degree of frag-
mentation at equilibrium, but hereby the adopted distribution strategies substantially influence results of simulations
(Fig. 3a). By varying the employed fractions of auctoritates, gaussian and, mainly, delta distributions show best
trends in terms of convergence to a mono-cluster state. The bimodal distribution tends to converge to a bi-clustered
state (Fig. 3b, lower).
Figure 4 shows results of insertion of PMs into a bi-clustered starting population (that is, a population where
initially half population has opinion equal to 0.25 and the remaining half equal to 0.75); previous results are confirmed.
Diplomats become efficacious only for higher fractions of employment and mainly with a gaussian distribution.
Auctoritates, spread with either a gaussian or, above all, a delta strategy, assure the convergence to a mono-clustered
asymptotic state since lower fractions of employment.
Opinion and affinity final distributions - Concerning the configuration of the opinions and affinities at the
end of the dynamics, we verified that the former distribute so that the surviving ones are all equidistant, that is, if
there is a monocluster the unique final opinion will be around 0.5 (see Fig. 1), if there are two cluster the survived
opinions will be close to 0.25 and 0.75 (see Fig. 5), and so on. On the other hand, the final affinities distribute in the
simplest way: agents belonging to the same cluster (i.e., share the same final opinion) will have affinity equal to 1
towards each other, and practically to 0 if instead they end up with different opinion, as shown in Fig. 6.
6FIG. 3. Behavior of a system modulated by auctoritates, for four different initial distributions. a) Mean number of survived
clusters at the equilibrium as a function of the fraction of auctoritates. b) Probability of having N clusters at the equilibrium in
a single run, 5% of auctoritates (upper figure), 50% of auctoritates (lower); for sake of clearness, the histograms are interpolated
by ninth degree polynomials (naturally, the effectively measured probabilities are in correspondence of integer values of the
abscissas).
FIG. 4. Mean number of survived clusters in the final configuration as a function of the fraction of PMs, for different initial
distributions of them, in case of an initially bi-clustered system. a) Acting diplomats; b) Acting auctoritates.
FIG. 5. Opinion trajectories for a system of N = 100 individuals, with 5% of diplomats initially uniformly distributed. In this
realization, the system has ended up with two final clusters.
7FIG. 6. Color representation of the final affinity matrices for systems of N = 100 individuals and 10% of initially delta-
distributed auctoritates (left, final monocluster), and with no PMs at all (right, four final clusters). The affinities of the agents
towards themselves, irrelevant for the dynamics, were set to 0.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The dynamics of our model is complex and highly non-linear, so that it would be quite hard to get analytically
the simulation results by means of a complete theoretical calculation. Anyway, it is possible to provide a qualitative
justification of the behavior of the model. Let us start by considering the case of absence of any PM, that is, when
every agent has the same openness of mind ∆Oc and all the affinities αij have the same (uniform) distribution ∀i, j.
In Figure 1a an example of how dynamics takes place in this case is depicted. We can utilize a simple mean-field
treatment to describe the dynamics. Therefore, said P (x, t)dx the fraction of agents having an opinion in the range
[x, x+dx], and having in mind the definitions given in Section II, the rate equation of the distribution P (x, t) is given
by
∂P (x, t)
∂t
=
∫ 1
0
dO
∫
|O−O′|< σ∆Oc
1−〈αij〉
dO′ P (O, t)P (O′, t) [δ(x−O + µ(O −O′))− δ(x−O)] , (7)
where we remind that σ is the social temperature. Analogously, it is also possible to write down an equation for the
evolution of the affinities:
dαij
dt
= Γ(t) αij [1− αij(t)] , (8)
where Γ(t) = sgn (|∆Oij(t)−∆Oc|). Now, let us focus on Eq. (7): it is formally completely analogous to the rate
equation of the compromise model (CM) defined in [11]. In the CM two individuals interact only if their opinions
differ less than 1, but the (continuous) opinions are defined up to a certain maximum value OM . It results that the
system ends up to final consensus only if OM < 1: in practice, the system orders if the maximum opinion difference
is not larger than the threshold for an interaction to take place. In our model max |O − O′| is of course 1, while
the threshold is, in the mean-field approximation we are utilizing, σ∆Oc/(1 − 〈αij〉), which defines the integration
interval of the integral in dO′ in Eq. (7). Therefore, proceeding in the same way of reference [11], it becomes crucial
the quantity
∆ ≡ σ∆Oc
1− 〈αij〉 , (9)
such that if it is larger than 1 (the maximum difference possible between two opinions), the system reaches consensus,
otherwise it remains disordered. Basically, in order to have final consensus it must hold
∆ ≥ ∆c = 1 . (10)
The existence of this transition is confirmed in Ref. [2], even though this mean-field approximation does not catch its
exact behavior. On the other hand, in Figure 1a we show the time evolution of a system with σ = 0.003, ∆Oc = 0.2
8and 〈αij〉 = 0.25 (see Ref. [2] again), that is with ∆ = 0.0008 ∆c, and actually consensus is not reached, compatibly
with the considerations stated above. We highlight the role of the social temperature: if σ → 0+, the probability of
reaching consensus goes to zero (rigorously, in the limit of infinite system), because a non-zero social temperature
makes two far away agents interact.
Despite the roughness of the previous calculations, this approach allows us to reckon at least qualitatively the effect
of the presence of the peace mediators on the ultimate fate of the system. As a matter of fact, auctoritates increase
the average 〈αij〉, and in a similar way diplomats increase the average 〈∆Oic〉, which substitutes the simple ∆Oc in
Eqs. (7) and (9): therefore, both make the quantity ∆ of the system larger, enhancing the reaching of final consensus,
as confirmed by the numerical results presented in Section IV.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the above sections we showed, both numerically and theoretically, that the presence of the PMs helps the system
to reach more easily the final consensus, with respect to the model without PMs, treated in reference [2]. It results
that these two kinds of special agents act differently and have different effects. More precisely, diplomats’ effects
are quite independent from their distribution throughout the population, as shown in Figure 2a, whilst auctoritates’
action is clearly sensitive to their dislocation in the opinion space (see Figure 3a). Moreover, when the auctoritates are
effective in favor of consensus, a smaller number of them is required with respect to the case with diplomats. In short,
the system shows the best response in terms of final consensus when few auctoritates are put just in the middle of the
social space of the population (i.e., with opinion equal to the average of the system, in our case 0.5). These results
are not in contrast with some real world features, in particular with the fact that mediators like auctoritates are less
common but more effective than diplomat-like agents. Indeed, while the main characteristic of a diplomat, a larger
openness of mind, depends only on the individual itself, acquiring authority to the others’ eyes is much more difficult
and does depend in general on the behavior towards other people. On the other hand, the personal prestige, once
obtained, is certainly more incisive in order to persuade other individuals. For this same reason, when the auctoritates
differ very much in opinion, they find much harder to drive the system to the consensus: as we can see in the real
world, if several charismatic figures push the people towards opposite positions, usually the whole population is not
able to get a general agreement.
Considering now a more theoretical point of view, as illustrated in Section V, the action of the PMs is effective
because practically they help to reduce the average distance among the individuals in the opinion space. Actually,
in their absence, unless all the individuals have a very high openness of mind and/or affinities towards each other,
the only way to increase the probability to reduce conflict and reach consensus is to increase the social temperature,
helping people to interact despite their differences, as illustrated in our previous works [2, 7]. Anyway, the social
temperature must be regarded as an intrinsic property of the environment in which agents find themselves to act, and
it would be difficult for whatever institution to change it in practice: on the contrary, it is clearly possible to send to
the population in conflict some Peace Mediators.
Otherwise, we can wonder how to reach similar results when the dynamics of the agents is not as defined here.
For instance, let us think to different types of continuous opinion models, in particular the LCCC model [12] and
similar ones [13]. In these models, agents exchange their opinions, but depending on the value of a parameter called
conviction, that is, the “inertia” an individual opposes to mind changing, the population can reach distinct final
states. When the individuals have a high conviction, the system is driven to a configuration where the individuals
have extreme opinions, giving birth to two totally contrasting factions. In such a case, mediators should simply aim
to reduce the agents’ convictions in order to reduce conflicts. With respect to these models, ours is more complex
since it is defined by more parameters, but has the advantage to represent at least partially the internal dynamics of
the agents’ minds [14].
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
In this paper we propose an application of the model of continuous opinion dynamics already introduced in [2, 6, 7],
by inserting two figures of Peace Mediators, one by one either diplomats or auctoritates respectively, into a population
of normal agents. We describe the behavior of the system in terms of opinion convergence and mean degree of
fragmentation for different fraction of employed PMs, also in reference to a more likely situation, namely the case
“two opposing factions”.
9The typical modus operandi of diplomats becomes more effective by inserting many of them. By referring to what
we said in section III, both the insertion of few diplomats into groups of small size and the increase of the mean ∆Oc
value of the population would lead to the same result. On the other hand, the promotion of few auctoritates, but in
suitable positions, can assure the convergence to a widespread consensus into populations of any sort, as pointed out
Sections IV and V.
The combined efforts of both the two kinds of PMs remain to be further investigated: in this paper we considered
them always acting separately because our aim was the understanding of their disentangled effects, in order to evaluate
more precisely their role and features. Also the effects of the population size, the time needed by such figures in order
to reach the global consensus and the role of hypothetical powerful neighboring (which could have interest in fostering
or hindering consensus) are still to be better understood. Finally, here we set the PMs as naturally different from
the normal agents, but it could be worth to understand if they can emerge from a suitable evolutionary framework.
To address all these issues, deeper studies, both of analytical and experimental nature, are needed in the next future.
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